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Evolution, Detection and Analysis of Malware for
Smart Devices
Guillermo Suarez-Tangil, Juan E. Tapiador, Pedro Peris-Lopez, and Arturo Ribagorda
Abstract—Smart devices equipped with powerful sensing,
computing and networking capabilities have proliferated lately,
ranging from popular smartphones and tablets to Internet
appliances, smart TVs, and others that will soon appear (e.g.,
watches, glasses, and clothes). One key feature of such devices
is their ability to incorporate third-party apps from a variety of
markets. This poses strong security and privacy issues to users
and infrastructure operators, particularly through software of
malicious (or dubious) nature that can easily get access to the
services provided by the device and collect sensory data and
personal information. Malware in current smart devices –mostly
smartphones and tablets– have rocketed in the last few years,
in some cases supported by sophisticated techniques purposely
designed to overcome security architectures currently in use
by such devices. Even though important advances have been
made on malware detection in traditional personal computers
during the last decades, adopting and adapting those techniques
to smart devices is a challenging problem. For example, power
consumption is one major constraint that makes unaffordable to
run traditional detection engines on the device, while externalized
(i.e., cloud-based) techniques rise many privacy concerns.
This article examines the problem of malware in smart devices
and recent progress made in detection techniques. We first
present a detailed analysis on how malware has evolved over
the last years for the most popular platforms. We identify
exhibited behaviors, pursued goals, infection and distribution
strategies, etc. and provide numerous examples through case
studies of the most relevant specimens. We next survey, classify
and discuss efforts made on detecting both malware and other
suspicious software (grayware), concentrating on the 20 most
relevant techniques proposed between 2010 and 2013. Based on
the conclusions extracted from this study, we finally provide
constructive discussion on open research problems and areas
where we believe that more work is needed.
Index Terms—smart devices, malware, grayware, smart-
phones, security, privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
SMART devices are rapidly emerging as popular applianceswith increasingly powerful computing, networking and
sensing capabilities. Perhaps the most successful examples
of such devices so far are smartphones and tablets, which
in their current generation are far more powerful than early
personal computers (PCs). The key difference between such
“smart” devices and traditional “non-smart” appliances is that
they offer the possibility to easily incorporate third-party
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applications through online markets. The popularity of smart
devices –intimately related to the rise of cloud-computing
paradigms giving complementary storage and computing ser-
vices – is backed by recent commercial surveys, showing that
they will very soon outsell the number of PCs worldwide [1].
For example, the number of smartphone users has rapidly
increased over the past few years. In 2011, global mobile
handset shipments reached 1.6 billion units [2] and the total
smartphone sales reached 472 million units (58% percent of
all mobile devices sales in 2010) [3]. In fact, the number
of ANDROID OS and IOS users alone increased from 38 to
84 million between 2011 and 2012 according to a report by
Nielsen [4]. The same report also indicates that the average
number of applications per device increased from 32 to 41
and the proportion of time spent by users on smartphone
applications almost equals the time spent on the Web (73%
vs. 81%). Furthermore, the number of worldwide smartphone
sales saw a record of 207.7 million units during 2012, rising
up 38.3% with respect to the same period in the previous year
[5]. Specifically, the global mobile Operating System (OS)
market share shows that ANDROID OS reached 69.7% at the
beginning of 2013, racing past SYMBIAN OS, BLACKBERRY
OS and IOS as depicted in Figure 1.
New smart devices are appearing at a steady pace, including
TVs [6], watches [7], glasses [8], clothes [9] and cars [10].
This is not only playing a key role in bringing to reality
much-discussed paradigms such as wearable computing or
the Internet of Things, but also finding innovative and very
attractive applications in critical domains such as, for example,
healthcare. Both medical staff and patients are increasingly
taking advantage of such devices, from regular tablets and
smartphones [11] to smart pillboxes [12], and the new gener-
ation of smart wearable systems (SWS) for health monitoring
(HM) or implantable medical devices (IMDs) [13], among
others.
A. Ubiquitous Networking and Smart Devices
One key element behind the popularity of smart devices is
their mobile nature along with their capabilities to provide per-
vasive user connectivity.Wireless communication technologies
offer smart devices the ability to ubiquitously communicate
with an ample variety of Internet services, remotely located
personal appliances, and wearable or implantable objects. The
most common wireless technologies used by current smart
devices are infrared (IR) and radio frequency (RF) commu-
nication. While the use of IR has gone unnoticed during the
proliferation of smartphones, it has recently become popular
again [15]. A wide variety of RF technologies are present
1553-877X/13/$31.00 © 2013 IEEE
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Fig. 1. Main smartphone platforms by market share from 2007 to 2012 [14].
in wireless communication capabilities for smart devices.
Perhaps the most notorious ones are Near field Communica-
tion (NFC), IEEE 802.15.1 (Bluetooth), IEEE 802.11 (WiFi),
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), Universal
Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), Radio Data
System (RDS), Global Positi oning System (GPS), Software
Defined Radio (SDR) and Cognitive Radio (CR).
Integrated wireless communications also provide smart
devices with new sensor capabilities. Current sensors have
evolved from mechanical transducers featured with network
connectivity (e.g., Wireless Sensor Networks [16] or Smart
Grids [17]) to communication-centric systems where many
information is acquired via communications interfaces. For
instance, some communication techniques allow devices to
sense their position based on radio signals transmitted either
by a local positioning system (e.g., cellular base stations, WiFi
access points, etc.) [18] or by a global positioning system
such as GPS. Additionally, communication standards such as
Bluetooth Low Energy (LE), namely Bluetooth SMART, allow
smart devices to sense information by simply communicating
with them. Similarly, the use of RFID and NFC can be used to
sense near field information by encoding it in programmable
tokens or tags (e.g., SmartTags [19]). Both Bluetooth SMART
and SmartTags technologies transform everyday objects into
powerful data sensors.
All these heterogeneous communication and sensing ca-
pabilities pull together several opportunistic networking
paradigms [20], such as: (i) Device-to-Cloud, (ii) Device-to-
Device, and (iii) Device-to-Environment, which have played
an important role in the proliferation of communication-based
services. For instance, paradigm (i) offer users the possibility
to remotely manage their devices, back-up data, or access
online software markets. In addition to this, other paradigms
such as (ii) and (iii) allow users to interact with their envi-
ronment for a better social experience, such as for example
multi-player games. Furthermore, the combination of different
communication and networking paradigms has made possible
the rise of very promising services, such as NFC-based e-
payment schemes, Location-Based Services (LBS), or even
novel forms of authentication in anonymous networks [21].
Most researchers agree that this trend towards a rich ecosystem
of wireless technologies will continue in the near future,
quite possibly in a more versatile way as (smart) devices are
increasingly capable of adaptively incorporating new software-
based communication capabilities via RadioApps [22].
While this fruitful environment of cheap, fast and heteroge-
neous communications capabilities has been key to the success
of smart devices, it has also brought about a number of security
and privacy concerns. Attack vectors have multiplied ([23],
[24]), and the availability of a myriad of networking paradigms
has given rise to new epidemic behaviors (see, e.g., [25]). Even
services that historically have been exceptionally harmless
have suddenly turned into a potential menace: one of the most
recent examples is the advent of AM/FM radio-based attacks
[26], which have proved to be particularly viral due to the
broadcast nature of RDS and the increasing popularity of SDR
and CR systems [27] based on RadioApps.
Recent communication-centric sensors rise new privacy
problems. For instance, sensors such as GPS can potentially
leak users’ location, and NFC-equipped devices can pose
traceability issues. Other sensors, such as for example the ac-
celerometer or the gyroscope, can be used to infer the location
of screen taps and, therefore, be used to guess user passwords.
These Device-to-Environment communication paradigms can
be especially harmful when correlated with others such as
Device-to-Cloud or Device-to-Device. All these features pose
a security threat to communications and fundamental research
in this regard is therefore required. In fact, several approaches
have tackled privacy leakage from the sensor’s perspective
[28], [29]. We next provide a closer look at some of these
issues.
B. Malware and Smart Devices
In many respects, smart devices present greater security
and privacy issues to users than traditional PCs [30]. For
instance, many of such devices incorporate numerous sensors
that could leak highly sensitive information about users loca-
tion, gestures, moves and other physical activities, as well as
recording audio, pictures and video from their surroundings.
Furthermore, users are increasingly embedding authentication
credentials into their devices, as well as making use of on-
platform micropayment technologies such as NFC [31].
One major source of security and privacy problems is
precisely the ability to incorporate third-party applications,
primarily from available online markets but also by other
means. There are currently two established models of smart
devices according to how users can access such markets [32].
In the open-market model, users are free to install applications
from any online market, whereas the so-called walled-garden
market model restricts the market from which users can
install applications. (In spite of this, users have found ways
of circumventing such restrictions by modifying the device
so that other markets will be accessible too.) Many market
operators carry out a revision process over submitted apps,
which presumably also involves some form of security testing
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to detect if the app includes malicious code. So far such
revisions have proven clearly insufficient for several reasons.
First, market operators do no give details about how (secu
rity) revisions are done. However, the ceaseless presence of
malware in official markets reveals that operators cannot afford
to perform an exhaustive analysis over each submitted app.
Second, determining which applications are malicious and
which are not is still a formidable challenge. This is further
complicated by a recent rise in the so-called grayware [33],
namely apps that are not fully malicious but that entail security
and/or privacy risks of which the user is not aware. And finally,
a significant fraction of users rely on alternative markets to
get access for free to apps that cost money in official markets.
Such unofficial and/or illegal markets have repeatedly proven
to be fertile ground for malware, particularly in the form of
popular apps modified (repackaged) to include malicious code.
The reality is that the rapid growth of smartphone technolo-
gies and its widespread user-acceptance have come hand in
hand with a similar increase in the number and sophistication
of malicious software targeting popular platforms. Malware
developed for early mobile devices such as Palm platforms
and featured mobile phones was identified prior to 2004.
The proliferation of mobile devices in the subsequent years
translated into an exponential growth in the presence of
malware specifically developed for them (mostly SYMBIAN
OS), with more than 400 cases between 2004 and 2007
[34], [35]. Later on that year, IPHONE and ANDROID OS
were released and shortly became the predominant platforms.
This gave rise to an alarming escalation in the number and
sophistication of malicious software targetting these platforms,
particularly ANDROID OS. For example, according to the
mobile threat report published by Juniper Networks in 2012,
the number of un ique malware variants for ANDROID OS has
increased by 3325.5% during 2011 [2] and by 614% between
2012 and 2013 [36]. A similar report by F-Secure reveals that
the number of malicious ANDROID OS applications received
during the first quarter of 2012 increased from 139 to 3063
when compared to the first quarter of 2011 [37], and by the
end of 2012 it already represents 97% of the total mobile
malware according to McAfee [38].
The main factors driving the development of malware have
swiftly changed from research, amusement and the search
for notoriety to purely economical –and political, to a lesser
extent. Current malware industry already generates substantial
revenues [39], and emergent paradigms such as Malware-as-
a-Service (MAAS) paint a gloomy forecast for the years to
come. This admits a simple explanation from an economic
point of view: all in all, attackers seek to minimize the cost
required to achieve their goals and, therefore, aim at obtaining
the maximum revenues with minimal efforts. For example, the
inequality
Cost(Attack)< Potential Revenue (1)
is used in [40] to give a cost-benefit analysis of mobile
attacks. This fits perfectly the case of smart devices such as
smartphones, where malware is rather profitable due to (i) the
existence of a high number of potential targets and/or high
value targets; and (ii) the availability of reuse-oriented de-
velopment methodologies for malware that make exceedingly
easy to produce new specimens. Both points are true for the
case of ANDROID OS and explain, together with the open
nature of this platform and some technical particularities, why
it has become such an attractive target to attackers (see for
example Figure 2, where the correlation between the market
share and the number of unique malware cases reported is
straightforward).
Correlations –if not causations– such as those discussed
above are paramount to understand future tendencies and
threats, not only in the case of smartphones or tablets but also
in other devices that soon will likely proliferate. For instance,
it has been recently reported that medical devices are plagued
with malware [42]. In the near future, it is quite plausible that
similar risks will affect vulnerable IMDs [43], leaving users
and patients exposed to exfiltration of highly-sensitive medical
information or even malicious manipulation [44].
C. The Malware Challenge for Smart Devices
Thwarting malware attacks in smart devices is a thriving
research area with a substantial amount of still unsolved
problems. In the case of smartphones, one primary line of
defense is given by the security architecture of the device,
one of whose foremost features is a permission system that
restricts apps privileges. This has proven patently insufficient
so far. For example, in the case of ANDROID OS apps
request permissions in a non-negotiable fashion, in such a
way that users are left with the choice of either granting
the app everything it asks for at installation time or it will
not be possible to use it. Most users simply do not pay
attention to such requests; or do not fully understand what
each permission means; or, even if they do, it is hard to
figure out all possible consequences of granting a given set of
privileges. For example, applications requesting permission to
access the accelerometer of a smartphone or a tablet are rather
common. However, it has been demonstrated that it is possible
to infer the keys pressed by the user on a touchscreen from just
vibrations and motion data [45]. Thus, using such a permission
in conjunction with Internet access –another rather common
privilege– could pose a serious risk of data exfiltration. On top
of that, the problem aggravates in platforms where apps can
interact with each other and share information, as one needs
to consider the privileges acquired by potential collusions.
Many of these problems cannot be solved by market op-
erators alone or by enhanced security models, as they really
depend on each user’s privacy preferences. For example, a
leakage of data such as one’s location or the list of contacts
might well constitute a serious privacy issue for many users,
but others will simply not care about it.
Even if a piece of malware gets it way into a device, it
remains unclear how it is possible to detect its presence. Tra-
ditional signature-based antimalware techniques suffer from
inherent limitations: they can only detect malware for which a
signature is available, and are useless against polymorphic and
metamorphic code. For example, a recent report by Zhou et al.
[46] shows that common smartphone antivirus software detects
only between 20.2% and 79.6% of analyzed malware. More
optimistic studies such as AV-Test [47], performed with a
much more restricted dataset, shows that 31 out of 41 solutions
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Fig. 2. Correlation between the number of malware cases and platform market share during a) 2009-2010 [41], b) 2010 [2], and c) 2011 [2].
tested presented a detection rate lower than 90%. Approaches
based on dynamic code analysis [48] are promising, but adopt-
ing and adapting them to smart devices is not straightforward.
For instance, many devices suffer from strong limitations
in terms of power consumption, so a constant monitoring
executed on the platform may be simply unaffordable. External
analysis performed on the cloud in near real time constitute an
alternative, although it is not exempted from privacy-related
risks.
D. Scope and Organization
In this article, we present a comprehensive survey of the
evolution and current state of malware for smart devices and
techniques proposed to thwart malware attacks. Our analysis is
strongly biased towards smartphones, since they currently are
the most extended class of smart devices and the platform of
choice for malware developers and security researchers. How-
ever, our discussion and conclusions apply to other devices as
well, and can help to better understand the problem and to
improve upon current defense techniques. In this regard, our
survey complements and extends other works such as [24].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we describe current smartphone security architectures and dis-
cuss a number of research works that have recently proposed
enhanced models to provide protection against malicious ap-
plications. In Section III we provide a characterization of the
various categories of malware developed for smart devices
by identifying possible attack goals, distribution and infection
strategies, and exhibited behavior. Other authors (e.g., [33],
[46]) have previously discussed similar issues for smartphone
malware, but not to the extent covered by this work. Fur-
thermore, our taxonomy is used to analyze the evolution of
malware using a representative sample of specimens that have
gained notoriety over the last few years.
Section IV analyzes and discusses malware detection ap-
proaches specifically developed for smart devices. Again,
we first identify a number of features according to which
each technique can be classified and use them to provide a
systematic review of the most relevant works proposed so far.
Among our contributions, we identify an extensive number
of indicators that can be monitored to detect the presence
of malware and that apply to any kind of smart device –
not only smartphones or tablets. Additionally, we correlate
these features with our malware characterization, pointing out
how each class of malicious behavior manifests in terms of
observable indicators.
Finally, in Section V we discuss open research topics and
in Section VI describe our main conclusions.
II. SECURITY MODELS IN CURRENT SMART DEVICES
In this section we provide an overview of the security
models and protection measures incorporated in current smart
devices, with particular emphasis on smartphones. The two
major mobile platforms –IOS and ANDROID OS– are built
upon traditional desktop Operating Systems (OS) and inherit
some security features from them. However, they also employ
more elaborated security models designed to better fit the
architecture and usage of these devices.
A. Security Features
A number of recent works (e.g., [49], [50]) have provided
detailed account of the major security features incorporated in
smartphones. In what follows we restrict ourselves to highlight
the fundamentals about:
1) security measures implemented at the market level;
2) security features incorporated in the platform; and
3) an overview of recently proposed security mechanisms
with particular emphasis on the protection against malware
that they provide.
1) Market Protection: A primary line of defense against
malicious software consists of preventing it from entering
available distribution markets. To this end, two basic security
measures are applied at the market level:
• Application review. Some official markets analyze sub-
mitted apps before making them available for download
and install. Operators do not give details about the
particularities of such reviews, but it is generally under-
stood that some form of security testing is carried out.
Furthermore, in walled-garden models devices can only
access some markets, which presumably only distribute
reviewed apps.
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• Application signing. Most markets force authors to sign
their apps. This allows authors to claim authorship and
also has some technical consequences in certain platforms
(e.g., apps signed with the same certificate can share
resources). Thus, a device can be sure about the integrity
of an app by verifying the associated signature against
the corresponding certificate authority.
Both measures have proven so far insufficient to combat
malware. Manually reviewing applications is a a difficult and
time-consuming task, impossible to perform in full extent due
to the massive number of applications being submitted every
day. Automated approaches have been recently explored as an
affordable alternative [51], [52], [53], [54]. For instance, in
2012 Google announced an application approval tool named
Google Bouncer [53] for ANDROID OS. Also in this line,
Zhou et al. proposes DroidRanger for detecting smartphone
malware in Android markets [54], [55]. Their analysis shows
that the infection rate in alternative marketplaces is one order
of magnitude higher than the official marketplace. Addition-
ally, they found that about 0.1% of the 204.040 analyzed
applications are malicious. We however believe that such a
fraction is much higher for two reasons. On the one hand,
samples were taken during a two-month period in the first
and third quarter of 2011. However, according to McAfee
Threat Report [56], the number of ANDROID OS malicious
samples experimented an exponential growth of 400% during
the fourth quarter of that year. On the other hand, the detection
heuristics used by authors present a high false negative rate,
ranging from 5.04% to 23.52%.
Even if application review processes were perfect, many de-
vices install applications through unofficial markets in which
there are no guarantees whatsoever about the trustworthiness
of such apps. Application signing can give users some as-
surance about the integrity of software downloaded from a
questionable source, particularly when such software claims
to be an unmodified copy of the same available in official
markets. But most of the time users do not perform such
verifications, nor it is possible to do so in many cases as
signatures are stripped off.
2) Platform Protection: Current platforms incorporate a
number of mechanisms to confine and limit the actuation of
malicious apps once installed in the device:
• Permissions. Most platforms provide a permission-based
system aimed at restricting the actions that an app can
execute on the device, including access to stored data
and available services (e.g., networking, sensors, etc.).
Au et al. [57] examine the permission system of several
smartphone OS, focusing on:
1) The amount of control users have over app permis-
sions. Depending on the granularity offered by the OS,
users can grant privileges using precise or coarse per-
missions. Additionally, such permissions cannot always
be individually enabled or disabled.
2) The information they convey to the user. Several plat-
forms offer the users specific information about how
applications are using resources. While some OS only
inform of what resources the application may use,
others track the actual use of permissions throughout
execution.
3) The interactivity of the system. Some permission sys-
tems require a heavy intervention of the user. Typically,
fine-grained permissions require more interaction than
coarse-grained. Furthermore, permissions can either be
requested only once (assuming they will remain the
same) or they can be requested periodically.
A summary of their analysis is shown in Table I. These
results will be further discussed later on Section II-B
when discussing the security features of the most im-
portant platforms. A recent study by Felt et al. [58], [59]
on the effectiveness of app permission systems concludes
that they are rather effective at protecting users. However,
in the case of ANDROID OS it points out that many apps
request a significant amount of permissions identified
as potentially dangerous and that frequent exposure to
warnings drastically reduces effectiveness. Furthermore,
authors also conclude in [59] that apps are often overpriv-
ileged due to a lack of documentation and development
bad practices. In this regard, Barrera et al. [60] propose
a methodology for analyzing permission-based security
models and suggest to increase the expressiveness without
maintaining the total number of permissions.
• Sandboxing. Trusted execution environments are a se-
curity mechanism used by some platform architectures
to isolate running applications based on mandatory ac-
cess control policies. Sandboxing can provide protection
against malicious applications to a certain extent, but are
ineffective if users overlook the permissions entitled to
installed apps. Furthermore, sandboxing do not prevent
apps from exploiting system or kernel vulnerabilities and,
besides, can also be bypassed in some cases [61]. In
this regard, several works [62], [32], [63], [64] propose
the use of hypervisors that run directly on the hardware.
Other authors (e.g., [65]) have focused on optimizing the
virtual machine manager, as virtualization introduces a
trade-off between security and performance [66].
• Interactions between apps. Some platforms provide the
developer with a rich inter-application communication
system to facilitate component reuse. Such Inter Com-
ponent Communication (ICC) systems introduce several
security issues. For example, in a compromised device
messages exchanged between two components could be
intercepted, stopped, and/or replaced by others, as they
generally are not encrypted or authenticated. Addition-
ally, two or more malicious applications can collude to
violate app security policies, such as for example in the
so-called re-delegation attacks [67]. Chin et al. [68] have
recently identified a number of security risks derived from
the app interaction system in ANDROID OS. Their re-
ported results show that 97% of the analyzed applications
are exposed to activity hijacking; 57% to activity launch;
56% to broadcast injection; 44% to broadcast theft; 19%
to service hijacking; 14% to service launch; and 13% to
system broadcast without action check.
• Remote management. Some market and network oper-
ators, as well as platform manufacturers, are empowered
with the ability to remotely remove apps from the device
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TABLE I
PERMISSION MODELS IN THE MAIN SMARTPHONE PLATFORMS [57].
Platform #Perm. Control Information Interactivity
ANDROID OS 75 Medium High Low
WINDOWS MOBILE 15 Medium Medium Low
IOS 1 Low Low Low
BLACKBERRY OS 24 High High High
and even repair damages caused by malware. This can
be seen as an extension of other functionalities already
present, such as for example updating the OS or applying
patches. However convenient, this feature can be seen by
many users as too intrusive and is not exempt from risks,
both privacy-wise but also in case of compromise of the
remote management function.
3) Other Proposals: Over the last few years there has
been an explosion of proposals suggesting enhanced security
models and alternative policy languages to improve upon the
limitations discussed above. The interested reader can find a
summary in recent surveys, such as for example [50]. The
majority of them fall in one or more of the next categories:
1) Rule driven policy approaches [69], [70], [71], [72]
propose richer languages based on rules, aiming at palliat-
ing insufficient policy expressibility on current protection
systems.
2) High-level policy protection techniques focus on en-
forcing information flow throughout the system. Several
approaches focus on applying different labeling systems
[73], while others enforce full isolation based on distinct
security profiles within a single device [65].
3) Platform hardening aims at simplifying underlying plat-
form layers, i.e., bootloader and kernel, to mitigate the
risk of unpatched vulnerabilities [32]. SELinux-based
systems [74] and remote attestation [75] approaches can
be applied to improve trusted computing base protection.
4) Multiple-users protection assumes scenarios where dif-
ferent users share the same device. Several approaches
focus on applying different access control mechanisms
such as DifUser [76] or RBACA [77] (a Role Based
Access Control for Android).
Most of these proposals would certainly provide enhanced
protection against malicious apps. However, in many cases
they ultimately rely on richer –and more complex– policies
that users must specify. But users generally lack security ex-
pertise [78], and developing complete and consistent security
policies is far from being an easy task even for experts with the
appropriate background. It can be argued that devices could
use policies created by others, but it is unclear to what extent
“one size fits all.” Furthermore, there is an incipient interest on
intentionally bypassing the platform protection mechanisms to
gain full control of the device and, for example, install apps
otherwise forbidden.
B. Security Features in Dominant Platforms
When compared with traditional PCs, smartphone platforms
have taken an innovative approach to securing the device and
the distribution of software. We next provide an overview of
some of the security features present in the five platforms that
currently dominate the market.
1) Symbian: SYMBIAN OS security model is based on
a basic permission system. Phone resources are controlled
by the OS using a set of permissions called “capabilites”.
Furthermore, applications run in user space, while the OS
run in kernel space. Those applications requiring access to
protected libraries must be signed using a certificate issued by
Symbian, while all others can be self-signed [49]. Protection
at the market level is inexistent or very low.
2) BlackBerry: BLACKBERRY security model is based on
a coarse-grained permission protection model. Applications
have very limited access to the device resources and, as in
the case of BLACKBERRY OS, they must be signed by the
manufacturer (RIM) to be able to access resources such as,
for example, the user’s personal information. Additionally,
applications must get user authorization to access resources
such as the network. However, once the user grants access
to an application to use the network, the application can both
send SMSs and connect to Internet [79]. Although applications
are not executed in a sandbox, some basic process and memory
protection is offered. For instance, a process cannot kill other
processes nor access memory outside the app bounds.
3) Android: Google’s ANDROID OS security model relies
on platform protection mechanism rather than on market
protection, as users are free to download applications from
any market. Applications declare the permissions they request
at installation time through the so-called manifest. If the
user accepts them, the operating system will be in charge of
enforcing them at running time.
Many researchers have pointed out that ANDROID OS’s per-
missions are overly broad and have proposed alternatives and
extensions. For example, Ongtang et al. propose a fine-grained
permission model called Saint to limit the granularity at which
resources are accessed [72]. Similarly, Jeon et al. [80] propose
a framework that enhances ANDROID OS’s security policies
and extends permission enforcement both an installation time
and during runtime. Schreckling et al. introduced in [81]
Constroid, a framework to define data-centric security policies
for access management. Security policies are here defined for
each individual resource, instead of specifying permissions for
each app. Furthermore, such definition can be done at a fine-
grained level, allowing users to, for example, grant an app
access to a part of the address book only. A major consequence
is that security policies are therefore defined by the user, not by
the developer. However, this approach can easily overwhelm
users as they are held responsible of specifying security and
privacy policies.
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Additionally, ANDROID OS uses sandboxing technique and
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) to protect
applications from malicious interference of others apps. Al-
though ANDROID OS isolates each running process, apps
can still communicate with each other using ICC, a rich
functionality that, however, introduces risks such as those
discussed before. Bugiel et al. introduce a security framework
called TrustDroid [82] to separate trusted an untrusted appli-
cations into domains, firewalling ICCs among these domains.
Similarly, Dietz et al. propose Quire [83], a signature scheme
that allow developers to specify local (ICC) and remote
(RPC) communication restrictions. Other proposals such as
TaintDroid [84], AppFence [85] or XManDroid [70] closely
monitors apps to enforce given security policies. The first two
uses dynamic taint analysis to prevent data leakage and protect
user’s privacy, while the last one extends ANDROID OS’s
security architecture to prevent privilege escalation attacks
at runtime. The main difference between TaintDroid and
AppFence is that the latter tries to covertly anonymize private
information prior to blocking leakages.
Furthermore, all ANDROID OS applications must be signed
with a certificate to identify the developer. However, the
certificate can be self-signed, in which case no certificate
authority verifies the identity of the developer.
Several articles discuss ANDROID OS security model [86],
[87], providing a deep understanding of android architecture.
Enck et al. [88] also present a study of Android security by
analyzing 1100 free applications. We refer the reader to these
works for further details.
4) iOS: Apples IOS security model [89] relies on market
protection mechanisms rather than enforcing complex per-
mission polices on the device at installation time. Apple’s
App Store is a walled-garden market with a rigorous review
process. Those processes are essential for preventing malware
from entering the devie, as runtime security mechanisms are
limited to sandboxing and user supervision. IOS isolates each
third-party application in a sandbox. However, most of the
device’s resources are accesible1 and misuse of a few of them
–such as GPS, SMS, and phone calls– can only be detected
by the user after installation. Furthermore, IOS sandboxing
model is weaker than ANDROID OS’s, as Apple only uses
one sandbox to run all applications, whereas Google separates
each application in a sandbox [91].
Specific details on Apples App Store application review
are unknown. In July 2009 Apple revealed that at least two
different reviewers study each application [92]. However, it is
probable that Apple uses also static and dynamic analyses.
Applications distributed on Apple’s App Store must be
signed by a valid certificate issued by Apple. Developer
certificates are issued to individuals and/or companies after
obtaining a verified Apple credential. IOS dynamically verifies
that the application is signed, and therefore it is trusted,
before executing it. Nevertheless, IOS can be tampered with
(jailbroken) to install applications from alternative markets.
This practice violates Apple policies, causes the device to lose
its warranty, and avoids prevention of shellcode injection.
1In IOS version 5, although Apple is likely to introduce some modifications
in IOS version 6. Specifically, the new version will restrict access to most of
the device’s resources [90].
Latest versions of IOS provide a number of features to
protect user data based on master encryption keys and pro-
tected by a passcode. The entire file system is encrypted
using block-based encryption and can only be decrypted when
the phone is unlocked. Additionally, IOS supports ASLR and
Data Execution Prevention (DEP) to prevent the execution of
arbitrary code at runtime.
5) Windows Mobile: Microsoft’s market protection model
for WINDOWS MOBILE systems is based on application
review. Developers are also validated prior to application’s
approval. Platform protection in WINDOWS MOBILE is similar
to ANDROID OS. It uses a trusted boot component and code
signing to protect the integrity of the operating system. It also
provides signed drivers and applications through the Windows
Phone Store online market.
Latest versions of WINDOWS MOBILE (Windows Phone
7 and 8) incorporate isolation among different sandboxes
[93], and each app is executed in its own sandbox, named
“chamber.” While chambers are defined and implemented
using a number of system policies, each security policy defines
what permissions are given to an app, known as capabilities.
In this regard, users are informed of the capabilities of an
application prior to install. However, the only control users
have over these capabilities at runtime is quite limited, as
only GPS needs user authorization the first time an application
request access to it [57].
III. MALWARE IN SMART DEVICES: EVOLUTION,
CHARACTERIZATION AND EXAMPLES
Malicious applications for smart devices –notably
smartphones– have rocketed over the last few years, evolving
from relatively simple apps causing annoyance to complex
and sophisticated pieces of code designed for profit, sabotage
or espionage. In this Section we first provide a brief overview
of such evolution from early mobile platforms to current
devices. We subsequently propose a number of features that
can be used to classify, characterize and better understand
malware for smart devices.
A. Evolution
As in the case of traditional PCs, where malware evolution
was intimately connected to the increase in computing re-
sources and the advent of the Internet, the complexity and hos-
tility of malicious software has intensified from early mobile
handsets to the current generation of smart devices. In the early
2000s, Palm platforms were affected by malicious software
that mimicked strategies well-known in PC malware. For
example, Symb/Liberty, Symb/Vapor and Symb/Skuller were
popular trojans at the time, i.e., applications that perform some
useful function while simultaneously conducting malicious
activities. Others such as Symb/Phage employed classical virus
propagation strategies to infect additional programs present in
the handset. Their malicious payload varied, but in all cases it
was sought to inflict damage over user information or corrupt
system files in order to cause a device failure.
The rise of featured mobile phones brought about a variety
of distinctive infection vectors when compared to traditional
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PCs, primarily through the communication and network-
ing functions offered by 3G, Wi-Fi, EDGE, Bluetooth, the
SMS/MMS messaging system, and NFC [94], [95]. For in-
stance, Symb/Cabir was one of the first SYMBIAN OS worms
using Bluetooth to infect other devices. Additionally, when
handsets were given Internet connectivity and the possibility
to easily install third-party applications, more sophisticated in-
fection strategies appeared. One early example was Symb/Yxes,
which used the SMS channel and support from remote servers
to propagate and configure itself.
The availability of mobile networking and pay-per-use
services contributed to a rapid escalation of the malware
phenomenon, both in featured phones and smartphones. Ex-
amples such as Android/YZHCSMS.A and WinCE/Fakemini
send premium-rate SMSs without the user’s knowledge, which
results in very significant revenues for the owner of the regis-
tered number. Others such as Android/Smspacem have been
also driven by economic incentives: sending spam through
SMSs.
In recent years, the proliferation of smartphones with
improved sensing and networking capabilities has trans-
lated into more sophisticated threats. For example, An-
droid/DroidKungFu and iPhone/FindAndCall steal a variety
of personal information stored in the device and exfiltrate it
through the network to a remote server. Other pieces of mal-
ware such as Android/Spybubble, Android/Nickispy and FinSpy
Mobile2 have evolved into fully fledged spy instruments with
the ability to monitor, record and exfiltrate the device’s current
location, ongoing and past phone calls and SMS logs to name
a few. Although more illustrative examples are provided later
on this section, readers interested in a more in-depth study are
referred to the recent work of Zhou and Jiang [46], where a
study of more than 1200 malware samples is presented.
It is plausible to believe that similar threats will soon affect
other smart devices such as smart TVs or IMDs. For example,
Auriemma [96] has recently shown that several versions of
Samsung’s Smart TV [6] are vulnerable to buffer-overflow
attacks that could allow an attacker to remotely control the
device. Many security vendors are already releasing security
frameworks for smart TVs, including antimalware products
[97]. The situation may become similar for medical devices
too, particularly for those designed to remotely monitor a
patient’s condition and/or control body functions. We are not
aware of any malware reported so far that affects existing
IMDs or other medical smart devices, although researchers
believe that malicious programs will certainly target them
sooner or later [98], [99].
B. Malware Characterization
Current malware for PCs have evolved into complex and
reuse-oriented pieces of software. Traditional classifications
have focused on factors such as the propagation strategy
(e.g., viruses vs. worms) or the malicious activity carried out
(trojan horses, spyware, adware, rootkits, etc.), among others
2FinSpy is a surveillance component part of a commercial surveillance
toolkit called FinFisher, designed to spy over a wide range of mobile
platforms. The mobile version is capable to monitor apps, emails, text
messages, etc. on Android, iOS, BackBerry, Symbian, etc.
[100], [101], [33], [46]. However, these categories are rather
imprecise and do not contribute to a better understanding
in terms of detecting the presence of malware, particularly
in current times where most malware present multiple and
constantly changing features.
We next identify several criteria according to which mal-
ware in smart devices can be described and classified. Each
provided criterion will be subsequently associated with some
observable behavior in one or more features of the device.
Thus, our classification will serve both to better understand
the functionality of malware, but also to point out where to
look for detecting malicious activities. We believe this can be
of help to improve upon current detection strategies.
We classify malware for smart devices in terms of the
following three features (a graphical summary is provided in
Figure 3):
• Attack goals and behavior: Identifying malware’s mo-
tivation on smart devices is paramount to have a better
understanding of its behavior and can be used to develop
targetted detection strategies. Such goals range from fraud
and service misuse driven by economic incentives, to
spamming, espionage, data theft and sabotage.
• Distribution and Infection: Malware creators can use a
variety of techniques to distribute malicious applications
and infect devices, from self-propagation mechanisms
based on vulnerabilities and misconfigurations, to simply
tricking the user into installing it by means of social-
engineering techniques.
• Privilege acquisition: Once the malicious code is in-
stalled on the device, it often needs to acquire enough
privileges to carry out its goals. This is automatic in many
cases, as the user might already have granted them to
the app, whereas in other cases technical vulnerabilities
and/or misconfigurations are exploited.
In the remaining of this section we describe each criterion
in detail and discuss some illustrative examples.
C. Attack Goals and Behavior
Felt et al. [33] analyze the main incentives behind IOS,
ANDROID OS, and SYMBIAN OS malware using a dataset
containing 46 specimens found between 2009 and 2011.
According to their analysis, the most common malicious
activities are related to the exfiltration of personal information
and user credentials (44%), followed by premium-rate SMSs
(33%) and, to a lesser extent, research, novelty, or amusement
purposes. It is also pointed out that the majority of the
analyzed pieces exhibited behaviors related to more than one
incentive, and that they often incorporate secondary goals such
as SMS advertisement, spamming, search engine optimization
and, in a few cases, ransom. About the 33% of the studied
malware changed their behavior based on commands received
from a Command and Control (C&C) server.
More recently, new pieces of malware such as An-
droid/NotCompatible [102] are demonstrating that attackers’
interests are not only limited to the scope of a smartphone
and its user, but to large private networks. By turning an
infected device into a TCP relay/proxy –capable of forwarding
network traffic–, smartphones can be used to support many
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Fig. 3. Malware characterization for smart devices.
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Fig. 4. Main attack goals, associated incentives, and exhibited behavior for
malware in smart devices.
infection vectors. For instance, an attacker could establish
an encrypted point-to-point session via HTTP with a device
located behind the firewall. Using such tunnel, the attacker
might be able to probe the private network and run exploits
against assets within the corporation. Thus, malware such as
Android/NotCompatible opens new opportunities for penetrat-
ing corporate networks.
Understanding the motivations behind malware can lead to
a better identification of its behavior. Figure 4 presents the
relation between most common incentives and the behavior
associated with them. Common behaviors can be classified
in monitoring (eavesdropping, profiling, etc.), service misuse
(SMS, call, email, other services used for spamming, etc.),
sabotage (draining the battery, deleting critical files, etc.), data
exfiltration, and fraud. Note that some behaviors could affect
two or more categories. For example, the unauthorized use of
SMSs for spamming might well be both a service misuse and
a fraud.
1) Example: Smartphone-based Botnets: A botnet is a
collection of compromised devices that can be remotely con-
trolled by an attacker (i.e., the bot master). As the number
of smartphones is rapidly approaching the number of PCs,
botnets for such platforms have gained momentum using a
variety of distribution strategies to harvest as many devices as
possible.
Traynor et al. [103] were among the first to study the
potential theoretical impact of mobile-phone botnets in cellular
networks. As far as we are aware, the first mobile botnet –
named SymbOS/Yxes– appeared in 2009 and targetted SYM-
BIAN OS platforms, using a rudimentary HTTP-based com-
mand and control (C&C) channel. iPhone/Ikee appeared later
on that same year, infecting around 21000 IPHONEs within
two weeks. One remarkable feature of Ikee was that it showed
how easy it can be to hijack a smartphone platform when root
exploits are available. Specifically, it exploited IPHONEs that
were left with the SSH port open and a default password after
having been jailbroken. Such simple but very effective attack
vectors can enable an attacker to control thousands of devices
through an easy-to-implement C&C mechanism, as Ikee.B did
[104].
C&C resilience is essential for a botnet to survive. In this
regard, smartphones are very attractive devices, as they offer
multiple communication alternatives that can be leveraged
to implement a C&C channel, including rather non-standard
means such as SMSs [105]. Nulliner et al. implemented and
evaluated an IPHONE-based mobile botnet named iBot and
demonstrated that thwarting them is more challenging than
in computer networks, in particular because of employing
multiple C&C channels (HTTP, SMS, etc.) in a peer-to-peer
(P2P) fashion.
Android/Andbot [106] introduced a new energy-aware C&C
strategy named URL Flux for ANDROID OS botnets. An-
droid/Andbot uses URL Flux to eliminate the single point
of failure problem present in Ikee.B and also reduces the
SMS fees incurred by iBot. URL Flux is a domain name
conversion used by Confiker –a Windows worm that infected
millions of computers between 2009 and 2011– based on
a domain generation algorithm seeded with a public key.
Recently, more advanced IOS rootkit-like malware such as
iSAM [107] integrates multi-functional tools also capable of
self-propagating to other IPHONE devices in ways similar to
Ikee’s.
Obfuscation is becoming popular in botnets, both by en-
crypting communications exchanged over the C&C channel
and also local resources that might facilitate detection through
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static analysis, such as server names and URLs, keywords, file
names, etc. AnserverBot makes extensive use of some of these
techniques, and also relies on posts made on public blogs to
retrieve code updates and communicate with other members
of the botnet.
2) Example: Grayware: The so-called grayware apps
gather potentially sensitive user and/or device information,
sometimes without user knowledge, and use it for dubious
purposes or in contexts that the user might well not approve.
For example, Aurora Feint is an app that sends the whole
address book to an unknown destination and was quickly de-
listed from Apple’s market in July 2008. Similarly, the author
of Storm8 –a popular game– was sued for collecting users’
phone numbers, and Twitter has been widely criticized for
sending the phone’s contact list without informing the user.
Most grayware apps claim to retrieve such information
for legitimate purposes and that it is crucial to improve the
quality of the service offered to users. This, however, has
recently become a major privacy threat for users’ privacy,
as apps collect excessive amounts of personal information
and it remains unclear whether the service provider will
use that data for legitimate purposes or not. Some platform
manufacturers are increasingly deploying measures to prevent
this. For example, in IPHONE a strict control is carried out to
guarantee that personal information is not sent to the cloud
unless really needed.
D. Distribution and Infection Strategies
Malicious programs employ a number of distinctive tech-
niques to distribute themselves. We next discuss the most
relevant and propose a taxonomy to classify them according to
the channel used to enter the device. Distribution techniques
are primarily influenced by malware in desktop computers,
although the emergence of app markets have opened new
possibilities. Two main approches exist: (i) self-propagation
and (ii) social engineering. A self-propagating piece of mal-
ware can use different strategies to automatically install the
payload into a device, whereas social engineering-based dis-
tribution strategies exploit the securiy unawareness of users
to trick them into manually installing the application (e.g.,
Andr/Opfake-C by Sophos [108], which spreads via Facebook
and, once installed, allows the attacker to perform premium-
rate calls).
We have identified six different distribution vectors that can
be used to infect devices:
• Market to Device (M2D): This propagation strategy
is based on market-borne attacks. An attacker uploads
a malicious application to a market, sometimes using
a stolen identity. Users can only get infected if mar-
kets accept such malicious apps and users install them.
Open markets, in particular those performing little or
no security revisions, are particularly vulnerable to this
distribution method. For instance, malware using devious
exploits (e.g.: Android/DroidKungFu3), might compro-
mise the device by these means.
3Android/DroidKungFu uses an exploit called ‘Rage Against The Cage”
[109] for privilege escalation
• Application to Device (A2D): This propagation strategy
is based on application-borne attacks. An attacker might
rely on a specific, vulnerable application to spread itself.
For instance, instances such as Andr/Opfake-C can use
Facebook to post links with a copy of the malicious code.
The main difference with M2D is that attackers assume
the presence of other installed applications (presumably
“goodware”) to achieve infection. In this regard, even
walled-garden models can be vulnerable to this type of
infection vector.
• Web-browser to Device (W2D): W2D uses web-borne
attacks to propagate the malware in way similar to A2D.
In this regard, we can consider W2D an specific type of
A2D. The difference is that A2D strategies are limited
by the possibilities offered by the application, whereas
in W2D malware can exploit general drive-by-download
strategies. This attack vector has recently gained popular-
ity due the widespread use of vulnerable multi-platform
components such as WebView [110].
• SMS to Device (S2D): This strategy is used by malware
that propagates via SMS or MMS or attacks that distribute
a malicious payload by these means.
• Network to Device (N2D): This propagation strategy is
based on exploiting vulnerabilities or misconfigurations
in the device. We distinguish between:
– Device to Device (D2D): When distribution is driven
by another device in a P2P-fashion, and
– Cloud to Device (C2D): When distribution is done
by a powerful computer such as a workstation or a
server.
• USB to Device (U2D): This strategy is used by malware
that enters the device through a port (typically a cable)
when connected to an infected PC.
1) Example: Repackaging: One of the most common distri-
bution strategy for smartphone malware consists of repackag-
ing popular applications and distributing them through alterna-
tive markets (M2D) with additional malicious code attached.
Repackaging is not a phenomenon exclusive of the current
generation of smartphones, although the proliferation of these
platforms and the impressive growth in available apps have
certainly contributed to make it a popular infection strategy.
As far as we know, M2D repackaging started with SYMBIAN
OS trojans such as SymbOS/Skuller and SymbOS/Dampig,
which replaced system applications and antivirus files with
modified ones. The focus has recently shifted towards AN-
DROID OS apps, particularly by repackaging popular games
and tools [111], including banking apps. For example, An-
droid/FakeToken trojan implements a man-in-the middle attack
to forward SMS messages with mTANs (Mobile Transaction
Numbers).
Zhou et al. present in [55] a systematic study of six pop-
ular third-party marketplaces for ANDROID OS. Their report
concludes that between 5% and 13% of all available apps
online are malware using repackaging, and the most common
incentive is fraud in the form of replaced in-application adver-
tisements to re-route revenues. The study also identifies a few
cases with planted backdoors and other malicious payloads.
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2) Example: Malicious Code Transference via Network:
In some cases, malware creators do not repackage an app
with the full malicious code. Instead, the modified app only
encloses a short piece of code that downloads and install the
malicious payload once the app is installed on the device. One
example of this variant –sometimes known as update attacks
[46]– is Android/DroidKungFuUpdate. Remarkably enough,
repackaged apps can enter the device without the user being
aware of it. By exploiting some technical vulnerabilities and
misconfigurations, some malware samples have even been able
to replace another installed app by a repackaged version of the
same one.
Repackaged apps often rely on obfuscation techniques to
avoid detection and to make static analysis harder [112]. For
example, in the case of update attacks the transferred payload
is often encrypted. In other cases, encryption is applied to
malicious components that are distributed together with the
repackaged app, usually as if they were class files, images
or other raw resources. For instance, Android/RootSmart and
Android/Fjcon use AES to hide domain names and URLs;
Android/Geinimi conceals URLs by encrypting them with
DES; and Android/OpFake simply makes an XOR with a
predefined key.
E. Privilege Acquisition
Exploitation strategies comprise a variety of techniques used
by malware to gain the privileges required to achieve its goals.
We distinguish two broad classes:
• User Manipulation: In many cases, privileges are di-
rectly granted by users who are not aware of the potential
repercussions of doing so. These strategies, which rarely
involve any technical sophistication, can be surprisingly
effective and very damaging. Common forms of user
manipulation include:
– Social engineering.
– Malware and/or grayware installed by novice users
who do not understand –or do not pay atention to–
the permission model.
– Repackaged applications found in alternative mar-
kets.
As in other similar security problems in computing, these
methods can be prevented by raising awareness about the
dangers of malicious apps.
• Technical Exploitation: In other cases the malicious app
can escalate by exploiting technical vulnerabilities or mis-
configurations of the platform. Even though the particular
technical means greatly depend on each platform, the
most common current attacks include [68], [61]:
– API vulnerabilities.
– Buffer overflows.
– Code injection attacks.
– ICC vulnerabilities.
– Return-oriented Programming (ROP) and ROP with-
out return flaws.
– System vulnerabilities.
– Netwoking protocol flaws.
– Bootloader vulnerabilities.
– Rooted device-based vulnerabilities.
1) Example: Rootkits: Current smartphone platforms are
becoming increasingly complex, including not only the op-
erating system itself but also dozens of libraries that give
support to the services offered by the device. Kernel-level
rootkits similar to those known for traditional PCs have
recently appeared with identical purposes, namely to hide the
existence of malicious software from the operating system.
Most rootkits infect devices via N2D vectors, but app markets
–official or not– are increasingly playing a key role. For
example, it is pointed out in [46] that repackaged apps that
implement technical exploits to gain root access once installed
in the device do exist. Such exploits are often distributed
with the repackaged app or acquired from a remote server
as they become available. Contrarily, other exploits involve
user manipulation to acquire privilege escalation. For example,
iPhone/Mobileconfigs [113] allows an attacker to remotely
hijack the device by installing malicious system-level settings
into the device through social engineering.
Root exploits in IPHONE are often quickly patched by Apple
and it is difficult to find malware samples exploiting these
vulnerabilities [114]. The first exploit known for IOS was
identified as early as 2007 and exploited a buffer overflow
in the libtiff library. Other known exploits affected the SMS
service –SMS fuzzing, presented at Black Hat USA 2009 by
Miller and Mulliner– and PDF-related functionalitites –as the
one used by iPhone/JailbreakMe to root IOS 4.3.3 and earlier
versions via a web browser. Later in 2011, Miller submitted
iPhone/InstaStock [115], which, after being approved, dis-
closed a hidden payload endowing InstaStock with remotely
controlled root capabilities.
Hypervisors are a common strategy to counteract rootkits.
Although there are some approaches to incorporate them
on smartphones, such architectures are heavyweight and not
widely available yet. Bickford et al. [116] implemented three
proof-of-concept rootkits for Android. Firstly, they rootkit the
GSM Linux Kernel Module (LKM) in a way that a remote
attacker can listen to the victim’s conversations. Secondly, they
rootkit the GPS LKM so that the attacker compromises the
victim’s location privacy. And thirdly, they exploit a number
of power-intense services so that the battery is drained in two
hours. They conclude that there is currently no effective nor
efficient technique to detect infection by rootkits.
F. Discussion
Table II shows a representative set of smarphone malware
and provides, for each one of them, sought attack goals and the
distribution and privilege acquisition strategies implemented.
Various conclusions can be drawn:
• M2D strategies clearly dominate other distribution and
infection strategies. This conforms the study conducted in
[46] over 1200 samples of ANDROID OS malware, which
points out that 86% of them use repackaging techniques.
• Privileges are mostly acquired by simple user manipu-
lation, i.e., by simply asking the user to grant them to
the app. This is certainly worrysome and motivates many
recent works dealing with enhanced permission models
and novel ways of communicating requested privileges to
users. Even though repackaging is nowadays the primary
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TABLE II
SAMPLES OF SMARTPHONE MALWARE FOR THE MAIN OS AND THEIR MOST RELEVANT CHARACTERISTICS.
Attack Goals Distribution / Infection P.A.
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FinSpy Mobile •   – – – • • • • • • •
Symb/Cabir ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ – – – • – – • –
Symb/Skuller   •   • – – – – – • –
Symb/Yxes • – • – – • – – – • • –
Sym/ZeusMitmo •     • – – – – – • •
BB/FlexiSpy • – – – – • – – – – – • –
BB/BBproxy – • – – – • – – – – – • –
BB/ZeusMitmo •     • – – – – – • •
And/YZHCSMS • – – – • • – – – – – • –
And/SpyBubble • – – – – • – – – – – • –
And/SimChecker • – – – – • – – – – – • –
And/BaseBridge • – – – – • – – – – – • –
And/GinMaster • – – – – • – – – – – • –
And/DroidKungFu • – – – – • – – – – – • –
And/AutoSPSubs – – – – • • – – – – – • –
And/Nickispy • – – – – • – – – – – • –
And/Smspacem – • – • – • – – – – – • –
And/Crusewind • – – – – • – – – – – • –
And/Zsone – • – – – • – – – – – • –
And/GGTracker • • – • – • – – – – – • –
And/AdSMS • • – – – – – • – – – – •
And/Fakeplayer – • – – – • – – – – – • –
And/Bgserv • – – – – • – – – – – • –
And/Lightdd • – – – – • – – – – – • –
And/Rootcager • – – – – • – – – – – • •
And/Opfake – • – – – • • – – – – • –
And/OneClickFraud – – – – • • – – – – – • –
And/FakeToken – – – – • • – – – – – • –
iP/MogoRoad – – – – • – – • – – – – •
iP/JailbreakMe – ♦ – – – – – • – – – – •
iP/InstaStock ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ • – – – – – – •
iP/FindAndCall • – – • – • – – – – – • –
iP/Mobileconfigs      – – • – • – • –
iPJ/iKee.A ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ – – – • – – – •
iPJ/iKee.B      – – – • – – – •
iPJ/Dutch 5 – – – – • – – – • – – – •
iPJ/Privacy.A • – – – – – – – • – – – •
WinCE/Duts.A ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ • – – – – – • –
WinCE/Fakemini – • – – – • – – – – – • –
WinCE/Pmcryptic – • – – – – – – – • – • –
WinCE/Terred – • – – – • – – – – – • –
WinCE/ZeusMit. •     • – – – – – • •
Legend:
Symb: Symbian iPJ: Jailbroken iPhone iP: iPhone
And: Android WinCE: Windows Mobile BB: BlackBerry
•: The referred characteristics are applied to the application.
♦: Proof-of-concept for demonstration, novelty or amusement purposes.
: Multi-purpose malware having multiple goals.
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entry point for malware, it is pointed out in [46] that
36.7% of studied specimes attempt to leverage technical
exploits to obtain root privileges.
• In terms of behavior, malware with just one goal is
rare. Most samples spy on users and steal personal data,
but also attempt to commit fraud or misuse services. A
possible explanation for this is the reconfigurable nature
of most malware specimens through updates, as in the
case of botnets. Thus, attackers basically seek to plant
a basic bot engine in the device, and then to provide
it with instructions and further code to perform specific
tasks. Again, this conforms similar studies carried out
recently. For example, in [46] it is pointed out that 90%
of the samples turn the compromised device into a bot;
almost half of them (45.3%) try to misuse SMS or call
services to obtain financial profit; and 51.1% harvest user
information. Finally, sabotage is quite unusual, with only
a few examples that drain the device’s battery or remove
selected files.
• There are remarkable differences between ANDROID OS
and IPHONE malware in the three criteria of our taxon-
omy
– First, most ANDROID OS malware is distributed by
markets, notably in the form of repackaged appli-
cations. IPHONE barely suffers from such infection
vectors, and the majority of malware enters via web
and network exploits. In part, this is a consequence
of the walled-garden model of Apple’s market.
– The differences in their respective permission models
and the way of granting privileges also show up:
while a significant fraction of ANDROID OS malware
is entitled with sufficient privileges by the user –even
if it later escalates by other means–, in IPHONE most
specimens depend on technical exploits.
– Finally, in contrast with ANDROID OS malware,
most IPHONE specimens discovered so far have been
created for demonstration or amusement purposes.
A word of caution is appropriate, though: because of
its openness, ANDROID OS is the de facto platform-
of-choice for security research in smartphones, which
may have also negatively contributed to the malware
phenomenon; and, furthermore, Apple follows a less
communicative strategy about IPHONE malware.
IV. MALWARE DETECTION AND ANALYSIS
As detailed in the previous section, current malware pose
severe threats to security models in smart devices. In this
section we classify and describe the most significant advances
in malware detection systems for such devices [117]. More
precisely, we show how such systems build their foundations
based on a variety of detection techniques. These techniques
aim at identifying where and how malware manifests by
constantly monitoring various device-based features. We also
show how detection systems are driven by these features, as
they represent the key elements for malware identification.
We believe that this comprehensive study is paramount for
researchers and practitioners in order to facilitate the construc-
tion of new detection systems.
A. A Taxonomy of Detection Techniques
Malware detection is a complex process pulling together
monitoring, analysis and identification tasks. In order to
organize and better understand current detection systems,
we next propose a taxonomy based on the following seven
characteristics (see Figure 5 for a graphical summary):
• Type of Detection (ToD) There are two common types
of malware detection techniques according to how code
is analyzed:
– Static analysis: this type of technique attempts to
identify malicious code by unpacking and disassem-
bling (or decompiling) the application. This tech-
nique is a relatively fast approach and it has been
widely used in preliminary analysis to search for
suspicious strings or blocks of code.
– Dynamic analysis techniques seek to identify ma-
licious behaviors after deploying and executing the
application on an emulator or a controlled device.
These techniques require some human or automated
interaction with the app, as malicious behavior is
sometimes triggered only after certain events occur.
Static analysis techniques are well known in traditional
malware detection and have recently gained popularity
as efficient mechanisms for market protection [118].
As a major drawback, these techniques fail to identify
malicious behavior when it is obfuscated or distributed
separately from the app. Contrarily, dynamic analysis are
arguably more powerful in these cases. In fact, the only
way of learning what the app is really doing necessarily
requires to run the code and observe its actions. However,
the inputs generated by most dynamic analysis tools
are generally produced by using random streams of
user events, which might not trigger the execution of
the malicious payload, resulting in malicious apps that
avoid being detected. This particular shortcoming can
be tackled by modelling users’ behavior and providing
human-like inputs. Dynamic analysis can be used both in
the cloud for market protection or directly in the device,
although resource consumption is certainly a issue (see
later discussion on this).
• Type of Monitoring (ToM) Malware can be detected
by analyzing various features that serve to tell apart
benign from malicious activities. A monitoring system
can collect user-level, kernel-level, or hypervisor-level
activity, depending on the type of features that will be
extracted. Monitoring approaches include the collection
of: (i) system calls (SYS); (ii) network activity (NET);
(iii) event logs (EL); (iv) user activity; (v) instructions
(I); (vi) permissions (P); or (vii) program traces (PT); to
name a few. Each type of monitoring activity requires
the deployment of different instruments to intercept and
format the corresponding events. For instance, SYS re-
quires the use of a system trap technique with root
privileges, while NET requires capturing all packets from
the network interface. Additionally, monitoring any of
these features when the app is run in an hypervisor
requires the introspection of a virtual environment.
Monitoring can be potentially expensive in terms of
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Fig. 5. Taxonomy of malware detection techniques for smart devices.
resource consumption, particularly if a large number
of events is collected directly over the platform being
monitored. As far as we are aware, no power consumption
analysis has been carried out yet, but practical experience
suggests that intensive monitoring is prohibitive for cur-
rent smart devices.
• Granularity of Detection (GoD) A point related to the
ToM discussed above is how collected data is filtered in
order to select the detection scope. Monitoring can be
carried out at different levels:
– Per App: features related to a specific application are
monitored and analyzed independently from other
apps in the system. This type of feature classification
presents good performance when malware is a stand-
alone application.
– Per group of apps: in this case, data from a collection
of applications is gathered and analyzed. This is
potentially useful when malware’s goals are achieved
in a distributed way by several collaborating apps.
– Per device: detecting certain types of malware, such
as for example rootkits, requires a more general
detection approach focused on monitoring the device
itself rather than particular apps executed on it.
• Type of Analysis (ToA) The monitored information is
subsequently analyzed to extract evidence on the presence
of malware. Such analysis can be carried out by a
human expert (E), although this possibility is becoming
increasingly unaffordable, at least without the support
of automated analysis tools. There are several types of
techniques for analyzing data obtained after monitoring,
including: Clustering (CL), Support Vector Machines
(SVM), Self-Organizing Maps (SOM), other general Ma-
chine Learning (ML) algorithms, Control Flow Graphs
(CFG), Data Flow Graphs (DFG), Program Dependency
Graphs (PDG), etc.
• Type of Identification (ToI) Depending on the type
of identification carried out, detection systems can be
classified as either anomaly-based (A), misuse-based (M),
or specification-based (SPEC) system. This feature refers
to the principle guiding the identification of malicious
activities and follows the same ideas explored in Intrusion
Detection Systems [119], [120].
– Anomaly-based identification attempt to model the
“normal” behavior of the monitored system, clas-
sifying as anomalous any other behavior reported.
Anomaly detection techniques have the potential to
detect previously unseen malware. However, they
generally present a high rate of false positives, i.e.,
they are prone to detect rare legitimate behaviors as
malicious.
– Misuse-based identification –also known as
signature-based– aims at identifying known
malicious activity by means of predefined patterns
of signatures. Thus, only “malicious” behaviors are
modeled here. The main benefit of misuse detection
lies in its accuracy detecting well-known attacks.
Generally, for each know malicious behavior, misuse
systems are equipped with one or more signatures.
In this regard, maintaining an up-to-date database
with a massive amount of signatures poses a
major challenge. Furthermore, resource-constrained
devices are not capable of processing big amount of
signatures.
– Specification-based identification works on the basis
of predefined authorized behaviors (specifications)
and assumes that any activity deviating from them
violates the system policy and, therefore, is mali-
cious.
• Place of Monitoring and Identification (PoMI) Moni-
toring, analysis, and identification techniques are gener-
ally resource-intensive tasks that cannot be afforded in
battery-constrained devices. As a consequentce, in recent
years it has been proposed to extenalize many of such
tasks to more powerful platforms, even though some
processing still needs to be taking place in the device.
We distinguish three main classes of detection schemes
according to where monitoring and identification takes
place:
– In the device: both monitoring and identification
are placed locally in the device. This requires very
lightweight approaches and their scope may be quite
limited. There are two types of local monitoring
or identification techniques according to where the
monitoring is taking place:
∗ Local out-line (L): this type of technique aims at
monitoring the device by installing itself in one of
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Fig. 6. Taxonomy of monitorable features for smart devices.
the lower layers of the device’s architecture, and
generally require root privileges.
∗ Local in-line, also known as Inline Reference
Monitor (IRM): this type of technique rewrites
untrusted applications so that the monitoring code
is embedded into the app, and does not require
root privileges.
– Distributed (D) among other devices. Performs any
monitoring, analysis or identification task in a coop-
erative way among different trusted devices.
– In the cloud (C). Uses virtual environments for
running several devices on a single server machine
without reducing the battery life.
∗ Sandbox (SB): uses a tightly controlled set of
resources for running dynamic analysis over target
apps.
∗ Replica in the cloud (RC): uses remote security
servers for hosting exact replicas of the device.
Monitoring and identification techniques that are
placed on the replicas require complex synchro-
nization systems to ensure that the replica is at
all times identical to the actual device, as well as
collaboration with the service provider (e.g., the
internet provider for general purpose devices or
phone provider for smartphones).
– Place of Analysis (PoA) Finally, depending on
where the analysis component is placed –i.e., lo-
cally or in the cloud– the approach used poses
TABLE III
MONITORABLE HARDWARE FEATURES AND EXAMPLES OF ATTACKS
THAT COULD AFFECT THEM.
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Battery
Charging Enabled • – – – – – – –
Battery Voltage • • – – – – – –
Battery Current • • – – – – – –
Battery Temp • • – – – – – –
Battery Level Change • • – – – – – –
I/O
LED – – – – – – – –
USB Connection – – – – – – – –
Coverage Range – – – – – – – –
Press Key – – – – – • • –
Device Info.
IMEI – – – – – • – –
Device Id – – – – – • – –
SIM Card – – – – – • – –
Phone State – – – – – • – –
UID Access – – – – – • – –
UID Removal – – – – – • – –
different challenges. On the one hand, cloud-based
approaches require local preprocessing of the moni-
tored traces, transmitting them to the cloud, and wait-
ing for the results. Finally, results may be included
for further identification of malware. On the other
hand, local approaches might accelerate the delay in
obtaining the response, especially when traces are
too big and/or the connection is very slow.
B. Monitorable Features in Smart Devices
According to the monitoring approaches discussed above,
we next identify and classify a number of device-based
features that can provide evidence of malware activities.
We subsequently explore how the behavior of some
representative classes of malicious activities manifest in
subsets of these features. A summary of this taxonomy
–excluding the full list of features for each class– is given
in Figure 6.
– Hardware: this kind of features identify the state of
the hardware (HW) components of the device. We
group HW features in three subclasses: (i) battery,
(ii) input/output HW, and (iii) device info. Table III
provides a detailed list of features for each subclass.
The state of the battery or the access to the unique
device identifier can be used to detect a specific type
of malware. For instance, some botnets check first
that the battery is charging before performing heavy
operations. Another example of the use of HW-based
features for malicious purposes is access to the IMEI
of a smartphone with the goal of exfiltrating it.
– Communications: communications represent an es-
sential infection vector in smartphones. They include
the following features: (i) phone and internet calls,
(ii) phone and internet messaging, and (iii) network
usage (data other than calls and messaging), as
identified in Table IV.
• Sensors: on-platform sensors allow the device to inter-
pret the physical context of a user [121]. Currently the
most common sensors are: (i) accelerometer, (ii) GPS,
(iii) compass, (vi) gyroscope, (v) microphone, (vi) touch
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TABLE IV
MONITORABLE COMMUNICATIONS FEATURES AND EXAMPLES OF
ATTACKS THAT COULD AFFECT THEM.
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Calls
Phone
Phone Outgoing – • – – – • – –
Phone Incoming – • – – – • – –
Phone Missed – • – – – • – –
Phone Privileged – • – – – • – –
Internet SIP Incoming – • – – – – – –SIP Outgoing – • – – – • – –
Msg.
Phone
SMS Incoming • • • – – • – –
SMS Outgoing • • – – – • – –
SMS Read • • – • – • – –
SMS Privileged – • – – – • • –
MMS Incoming • • • – – • – –
MMS Outgoing • • – – – • – –
MMS Read • • – – – • – –
MMS Privilege – • – – – • • –
Internet XMPP Incoming • – – – – • – –XMPP Outgoing • • – – – • – –
Net.
Byte
WiFI TX Bytes • – – – • • – –
Phone TX Bytes • • – – – • – –
Bluetooth TX Bytes • • – – – • – –
WiFI RX Bytes • • – – – • – –
Phone RX Bytes • • – – – • – –
Bluetooth RX Bytes • • – – – • – –
Packets
WiFI TX Pckts • • – – • • – –
Phone TX Pckts • • – – – • – –
Bluetooth TX Pckts • • – – – • – –
WiFI RX Pckts • • – – – • – –
Phone RX Pckts • • – – – • – –
Bluetooth RX Pckts • • – – – • – –
Connections
WiFI CX • • – • • • – –
Phone CX • • – • • • – –
Bluetooth CX • • – • • • – –
DNS Resoluc. • • – • • • – –
sensors, (vii) speakers, and (viii) camera, as illustrated
in Table V. Access to sensors can be monitored to
identify malicious use. For instance, profiling malware
will typically access the user’s current location. Thus,
if an application is constantly accessing the GPS and
sending this information through the network, it could
be an indication of malicious –or, at least, potentially
dangerous– usage.
• System: access to system resources can be used to
identify malicious behaviors by monitoring: (i) processes,
(ii) storage, (iii) memory, (iv) package management, and
(v) scheduler, as identified in Table VI.
• User: there are a number of features that generally
involve user interaction and that could also provide
evidence of malicious behavior. We identify (i) user-
permissions frequency requests (applications can be clas-
sified into categories by monitoring the frequency at
which they request permissions [122]), (ii) third-party
apps, (iii) built-in apps, and (iv) other actions, as detailed
in Table VII.
1) Discussion: Malicious apps –as any other app– rely
on the device’s system and sensors to achieve their goals.
Different components of the device are therefore interrogated
by the malware to operate. For instance, the behavior of
botnets is deeply related to almost any kind of communication
feature as all bots rely on a C&C back-end. Additionally, they
could also require some system interactions in order to store
and update themselves. However, they are not likely to access
any sensor –unless the master commands it through a remotely
transmitted payload. Another interesting example is given by
TABLE V
MONITORABLE SENSORS FEATURES AND EXAMPLES OF ATTACKS THAT
COULD AFFECT THEM.
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Accelerometer
Access Accelerometer – – – – – • – –
Current Roll Pitch Yaw – – – – – • – –
Orientation Changing – – – – – • – –
GPS
Access Location – – – – – • – –
Current Location – – – – – • – –
Location Changing – – – – – • – –
Compass
Access Compass – – – – – • – –
Current Cardinal Orientation – – – – – • – –
Cardinal Orientation Changing – – – – – • – –
Gyroscope
Access Gyroscope – – – – – • – –
Current Angular Moment – – – – – • – –
Angular Moment Changing – – – – – • – –
Microphone Record Audio – – – – – • – –Access Audio – – – – – • – –
Touch Touch Screen Preasure – – – – – • – –Touch Screen Area – – – – – • – –
Speaker Access Speakers – – – – – • – –Play Audio – – – – – • – –
Camera
Take Picture – – – – – • – •
Access Picture – – – – – • – •
Record Video – – – – – • – –
Access Video – – – – – • – –
Calculate Depth (RGDB) – – – – – • – –
TABLE VI
MONITORABLE SYSTEM FEATURES AND EXAMPLES OF ATTACKS THAT
COULD AFFECT THEM.
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Processing
CPU Time – • • – – – – –
Runnable Entities – • – – – – – –
Context Switching – – – – – – – –
Wakelocks – – – – – – – –
Processes Changing – • – – – – – –
Storage
File Open • – – – – – – –
File Reads • – – – – – – –
File Writes • – – – – – – –
File Read Bytes • – – – – – – –
File Write Bytes • – – – – – – –
Memory
Dirty Pages – – – – – – – –
Active Pages – – – – – – – –
Anonymous Pages – – – – – – – –
Page Activations – – – – – – – –
Page Desactivations – – – – – – – –
Page Faults – – – – – – – –
DMA Allocations – – – – – – – –
Garbage Collections – – – – – – – –
Page Frees – – – – – – – –
Inactive Pages – – – – – – – –
File Pages – – – – – – – –
Mapped Pages – – – – – – – –
Writeback Pages – – – – – – – –
Pkg Mgmt
App Load Time • – – – – – – –
Install Packages • – – – – – – –
Delete Packages • – – – – – – –
Change Package • – – – – – – –
Restart Package • – – – – – – –
Master Clear • – – – – – – –
Scheduler
Yield Calls – – – – – – – –
Schedule Idle – – – – – – – –
Running Jiffies – – – – – – – –
Waiting Jiffies – – – – – – – –
fraud attacks such as Phising or Pharming. In these cases, the
malware is likely to use network connections in order to get
to the victim, access to SMS messages to steal, for example,
One Time Passwords (OTPs), or change the DNS resolution
of the device, but it will definitely not access sensors.
Accessing those components in a stealthy manner is still,
to the best of our knowledge, a limitation for attackers.
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TABLE VII
MONITORABLE USER FEATURES AND EXAMPLES OF ATTACKS THAT
COULD AFFECT THEM.
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User–permissions # requests • • • • • • • •
Third Party Apps
Apps Installed • – – – – – – –
Apps Usage • – – – – – – –
Apps Delete • – – – – – – –
Built–in Apps
Address Book – – – – – • – –
History – – – – – • – –
Bookmarks – – – – – • – –
Calendar – – – – – • – –
Feeds – – – – – • – –
Email – – – – – • – –
Other Actions Push Notifications – – – – – • – –Unlock • • • • • • • –
Nevertheless, there are some technical exploitation vectors
that allow a malware to root the device, which could thwart
detection at some levels. In those cases, access to hypervisor-
level monitoring is paramount to identifying such cases.
Tables III through VII present various examples of ma-
licious activities and the features that would likely allow a
detection system to identify them. Several conclusions can be
drawn:
• Monitoring can be a very heavy consuming task. Thus,
identifying a monitoring strategy as well as an appropriate
type of features is crucial to reduce workload and improve
detection efficacy. For instance, if a user is interested in
using his device in a Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD)
context, avoiding exfiltration of sensitive information may
be critical, and therefore monitoring only some specific
features would be a good strategy.
• From all eight cases studied, the most relevant group
of features affects communications (Table IV). In this
regard, it is also interesting to identify adaptive mon-
itoring strategies based on the appropriate amount of
features. Thus, if a detection system can likely identify
the most popular malware by only monitoring, say, 40%
of the features, then monitoring the remaining ones can
be eventually switched off, e.g., when the battery is lower
than a given threshold.
Finally, we emphasize that the list of detection features
presented in Tables III through VII are only an excerpt of
all those that can be used by a detection system. In general,
each type of device will offer a more or less exhaustive list
of available features for each category given above.
C. Overview of Detection Systems
In the last few years several works have been proposed to
detect malware on smart devices –mostly smartphones and,
more specifically, for ANDROID OS platforms. We have clas-
sifed the 20 most representative detection systems according to
the taxonomy provided above. The result, shown in Table VIII,
summarizes current research directions.
Even though all detection systems are strongly interrelated,
some general characteristics are evident. For example, while
some techniques are more versatile and, therefore, are used
more often, others are used mainly for certain detection sys-
tems. Thus, both static and dynamic analysis are used for both
device and market protection. However, it is more frequent to
use dynamic analysis for device-oriented detection and static
analysis for market protection. Despite this, dynamic analysis
is becoming an important technique for market detection as
well, as new paradigms based on Security-as-a-Service, such
as Replicas in the Cloud, are gaining popularity.
For the sake of organization, in the remaining of this section
we describe current research proposals grouped into three
main categories:
i) Device monitoring systems.
ii) Automatic app-review systems for market protection.
iii) Attack-specific malware identification systems (both for
user and market protection).
D. Device-based Monitoring Systems
Device-based malware detection systems have received
much attention lately. They mostly use dynamic analysis
techniques, although some combine them with static analysis
to improve the detection strategy. In this regard, both anomaly
and misuse detectors are proposed.
1) Anomaly Detectors: Schmidt et al. [137] leverage both
static and dynamic analysis for detecting malware in SYM-
BIAN OS and ANDROID OS devices. On the one hand,
function calls are first extracted, and monitored data is then an-
alyzed using decision trees. Classifiers are trained to recognize
normal and malicious apps. On the other hand, an anomaly-
based malware detection is used for dynamic analysis. Fea-
tures such as free RAM memory, CPU usage, SMS count,
etc. are monitored for further analyzing behavior. Analysis
is done in the cloud using machine learning algorithms such
as Artificial Immune Systems (AIS), Self-Organizing Maps
(SOM), Support Vector Machines (SVM), and Tree Kernels.
A somewhat similar approach is Andromaly [127], which
uses dynamic analysis for periodically monitoring a number
of features and machine learning anomaly-based detectors for
classifying apps as goodware or malware. In Andromaly, how-
ever, classification is done locally in the device. The scheme
monitors various system features such as CPU consumption,
number of network packages, number of running processes
and battery level. Redundant features are first eliminated
using three feature selection algorithms: Chi-Square, Fisher
Score, and Information Gain. Furthermore, collected obser-
vations are classified using K-Means, Logistic Regression,
Histograms, Decision Trees, Bayesian Networks and Naive
Bayes. Evaluation was performed testing a small number
of self-implemented malware samples, and results show a
detection rate accuracy ranging from 44% to 100%. More
precisely, they show that Fisher Score with 10 top features
selected, and using Naive Bayes and Logistic Regression,
perform better than the other classifiers. Although no real
malware is studied, their experiments help to understand
which machine learning algorithms are superior as well as
their degradation. In fact, their experiments show a 10% of
performance degradation in the worst scenario, i.e., 8 different
classifiers with 30 features. However, it is not clear how this
performance has been measured and whether the consumption
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TABLE VIII
MALWARE DETECTION SYSTEMS.
LEGEND
Platform Type of Monitoring (ToM) Type of Analysis (ToA) Place of Monitoring and Identification(PoMI) and Place of Analysis (PoA)
And: Android SYS: System calls E: Expert L: Local Outline
Win: Windows NET: Network ML: Machine Learning IRM: Local Inline (IRM)
Sym: Symbian EL: Event Log CL: Clustering C: Cloud
I: Instructions DG: Dependency Graphs DB: Distributed
Type of Detection (ToD) P: Permissions ST: Statistical HP: Honeypot
S: Static PT: Program Traces PRO: Probabilistic Models RC: Replica in the Cloud
D: Dynamic PCB: Process Control Block SB: Sandbox
API: API Calls Type of Identification (ToI) H: Hybrid
Other K: Kernel-level A: Anomaly
/0: Unavailable U: User-level M: Misuse
SPEC: Specification
Detection Approach
Plat. ToD ToM ToA ToI PoMI PoA Consumption Features Attack Observations
Dendroid
(2013) [118] And S I
ST,
DG,
CL
/0 C C
Discussed: deals
efficiently with
large databases
of malware
instances
Code Chunks –
a high-level rep-
resentation of the
CFG
Automatic
classification
of unknown
malware samples
The classification is done using
text mining and information re-
trieval techniques. Hierarchical
Clustering is also used to extract
evolutionary analysis
AppProfiler
(2013) [123] And S, D
API,
PT E M L L, C Not available
Permissions, and
API Calls Privacy leakage
API calls are analyzed stati-
cally using signatures and apps
are traced dynamically through
tainting analysis
Apps
Playground
(2013) [124]
And D SYS,PT /0 /0 C C Not applicable
Taint tracing,
SYS call, etc. Any kind
Heuristic-based UI interaction
based on contextual exploration
Secloud
(2013) [125] And * * * * RC C
Device consump-
tion not available Any kind Any kind
Detection techniques: AV scan-
ning, file integrity checking,
SYS call monitoring, or network
intrusion detection and response
TStructDroid
(2013) [126] And D PCB
STAT,
ML A L L
Performance
degradation
of 3.73% on
average
Frequencies of
99 preliminary
parameters: page
frames, context
switches, page
faults, virtual
memory, etc.
Any kind
Type of analysis: theoretic anal-
ysis, time–series feature log-
ging, segmentation and fre-
quency component analysis of
data, and machine learning clas-
sifier
Andromaly
(2012) [127] And D * ML A L L
16,78Kb ±32
RAM (≈ 8.8%),
5.52% ±2.11
CPU, and 10%
Battery (unclear)
Detection
Method:
monitorization of
features. Feature
selection: Subset
of selected
features from 88
initial categories
Any kind of
anomaly
Training Method: Classification
with labelled data. Experimental
evaluation
AppGuard
(2012) [128] And D PT /0 M IRM C Not available
Program traces
and generated
events
Privacy leakage
and user–level
misuse —kernel-
level is not
monitored
Analysis is done off-line, prior
to repackaging the app, i.e., in
the cloud
Crowdroid
(2011) [129] And D SYS CL A L C Not available
System calls per
application
Any kind of
anomaly
Training Method: Clustering
with k–means: i) malware,
and ii) goodware. Evaluation:
Experimental and wild malware
DroidScope
(2012) [130] And D * /0 /0 SB C Not applicable Any kind Any kind
ToM: Syscalls, etc. Ad–hoc plu-
gins for monitoring features and
analyzing data (authors provide
several proof of concepts, e.g.:
tainting
MADAM
(2012) [131] And D K, U ML A L L
Overhead of
3% memory
utilization, 7%
CPU and 5 %
battery
K: SYS, proc.,
memory, CPU
usage. U: user–
state, key strokes,
called numbers,
SMS, NET
Any kind of
anomaly
K-NN (with K=1) for classifica-
tion. 10 malicious apps and 50
benign. 93% detection rate and
5% FP
Peng et al.
(2012) [132] And S P PRO N/A C C Not applicable Permissions
Effectiveness of
apps permissions
RiskRanker
(2012) [133] And S I/P/API DG M C C Not applicable
Vulnerability sig-
natures, permis-
sions, API calls:
crypto, dynamic
code, IPC, and
JNI, etc.
Any kind
Checks a pre-defined set of ma-
licious operations (e.g.: known
exploits) to rate the severity of
stealthy applications
SmartDroid
(2012) [134] And H * * * SB SB Unavailable Any
UI–based obfus-
cation
Improved detection by generat-
ing UI-based trigger conditions.
Any kind of detection system
might be plunged, but no further
details are given
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Detection Approach
Plat. ToD ToM ToA ToI PoMI PoA Consumption Features Attack Observations
Woodpecker
(2012) [135] And S I/P DG /0 C C
Time consuming
analysis: 1 hour
per phone image
Executing
paths and 13
representative
privileged
permissions
Capability leaks.
Confused deputy
attacks
Uses CFG for detecting explicit
capability leakages and permis-
sion analysis for implicit capa-
bility leakage
PiOS (2011)
[136] iOS S N/A DG N/A C C Not applicable Instructions Obfuscation
Uses CFG for detecting capabil-
ity leakages
Schmidt et
al. (2011)
[137]
Sym/And S/D SYS CL A L C/DB Not available
Free RAM,
User Inactivity,
Process count,
CPU usage, SMS
sent, and others
not specified
Any kind of
anomaly
Training method: SVM–light
and user’s statistical data
Elish et al.
(2013) [138] And S I DG /0 C C Not applicable
Data event–
specific control
Component
hijacking for
information
leakage and
unauthorized
access
Uses DDG to track the user’s
private information
CHEX
(2012) [139] And S I DG /0 C C Not applicable User’s data
Component
hijacking for
information
leakage and
unauthorized
access
Uses system dependence graphs
to track the user’s private infor-
mation
AASandbox
(2010) [140] And D * CL M SB C Not applicable Not available Any kind
Training method: Unspecified
type of clustering. Evaluation:
Self–written malware
Paranoid
Android
(2010)
[141]
And D * * * RC C
Discussed.
Apparently larger
than expected
Not available Any kind
Training method: Dynamic anal-
ysis and AV Analysis. Evalua-
tion: Not performed
TaintDroid
(2010) [84] And D PT E M L L
Uses 14%
CPU and
4.4% memory
overhead. Power
consumption not
available
Variables,
methods, file,
and message
Explicit informa-
tion flow leakage
Type of monitoring: label-based
tracking of variables, methods,
files and IPC via dynamic taint-
ing, and enforced by the user.
Tainted variables are propagated
according to data flow rules
Kim et al.
(2008) [142] Win D HW ST M L L/C Not available
Energy consump-
tion
Energy–depletion
attacks
The consumption is monitored
using physical hardware (HW)
and the analysis is done either
at the phone or at the server (no
performance comparison is pro-
vided). The signatures are gen-
erated sampling the power con-
sumption history and matching
is computed using χ2–distance
exhibited is in the same conditions with the malware detector
or without it.
Similarly to Andromaly [127], MADAM [131] uses dy-
namic analysis for periodically monitoring a number of fea-
tures, and machine learning anomaly detectors for classify-
ing goodware and malware, locally in the device. However,
MADAM is evaluated using real malware samples, and con-
sequently needs a higher number of features to model user
behavior. Furthermore, collected observations are classified
using K-Nearest Neighbor (K-NN) with K = 1 (1-NN). The
evaluation was carried out with more than 50 goodware
applications and 10 malware samples along with several
user behaviors, improving the detection accuracy (93%) with
respect to the same classifier used in Andromaly [127]. The
results show an average number of number of 5 false positives
per day. The reported performance overhead is 3% of memory
consumption, 7% of CPU overhead and 5% of battery.
More recently, TStructDroid [126] presents a real-time
malware detection system for ANDROID OS devices. The
proposed system monitors Process Control Blocks (PCB) and
uses theoretical analysis, time-series feature logging, segmen-
tation and frequency component analysis of data, and a learned
classifier to analyze monitored data. Evaluation shows a 98%
accuracy and less than 1% false alarm rate, togetther with a
3.73% of performance degradation.
Finally, Crowdroid [129] is another anomaly-based mal-
ware detection system for ANDROID OS devices. The main
difference with Andromaly [127] and MADAM [131] is that
authors analyze the monitored featured in the cloud, whereas
the other two approaches train their classifiers locally in the
device. Collected observations are classified using K-Means.
Evaluation was also carried out using a self-implemented
set of malware samples, showing a detection rate of 100%.
Additionally, they also test their system with two malware
instances observed in the wild, showing a detection rate of
85% and 100% respectively. A key limitation in their study is
that they assume that outsourcing the analysis should present a
lower battery degradation than approaches that classify locally.
However, we consider that this assumption has to be formally
proven as some detection approaches are quite lightweight and
might consume less than continuously transmitting all traces
through the network.
2) Misuse Detection: AppGuard [128] is a malware preven-
tion system for ANDROID OS in which the monitoring system
is placed inline (IRM) with the application. Applications are
manipulated using the repackaging technique, and the monitor-
ing system is, therefore, inserted inside the applications. Ap-
plications can thus trace themselves and a number of security
policies can be defined to enforce system permissions at run-
time. Evaluation was performed using 13 apps, each of which
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was inlined with 9 policies. One noteworthy characteristic is
that inlined apps incur a negligible increment in their size.
Reported experiments in [128] also compare the execution
of three function calls in both the original and the inlined
app (the latter with no policies set), showing a degradation of
5.0%, 6.2%, and 1.0% of overhead respectively. In this regard,
we consider that the three micro-benchmarks used are not
conclusive due to their simplicity. Additionally, we consider
that these results cannot be compared with Andromaly as they
were not tested under the same conditions.
3) Replicas in the Cloud: Approaches such as Paranoid
Android [141] or Secloud [125] have focused on performing
malware detection tasks over synchronized replicas of the
device maintained in the cloud. Thus, all security monitoring,
analysis and identification tasks can be done in an environ-
ment not subject to battery constraints. Additionally, multiple
detection techniques can be applied simultaneously, as several
replicas can be run at the same time.
The proposed systems introduce several attack detection
mechanisms for dynamic analysis in the replicas such as
AV scanners and tainting analysis. However, Secloud [125]
extends those mechanisms and deploys a number of response
and prevention techniques, including file removal, process
termination, periodic backups, network filtering, and device
quarantining.
Experiments on Paranoid Android [141] show that syn-
chronizing the device with the replicas does not introduce
more than 2KB/s and 64B/s of trace data for high-load and
idle operation environments, respectively. This performance,
however, cannot be compared with Secloud [125], as for the
latter no information about the consumption of the device
being replicated is provided.
E. Market Protection
Most of the aforementioned techniques are typically de-
signed to monitor physical devices, although they can also
be used in virtual environments for market protection. Using
specific monitoring techniques for virtual environments can
bring about a number of benefits, such as (i) performing
a resource-intensive security analysis, (ii) enabling virtual
machine introspection [143] to intercept OS-level semantics,
or (iii) enabling the possibility of hosting exact replicas of
the device in the cloud (e.g.: CloneCloud [144], and ThinkAir
[145]) as mentioned before.
1) Sandboxing: Several approaches have been proposed for
malware detection in the form of sandboxes. For example,
AASandbox [140] is an ANDROID OS analysis sandbox for
both static and dynamic analysis. AASandbox uses an android
emulator, pre-loaded with a SYS call monitoring service.
DroidScope [130] is another sandbox for ANDROID OS
based on virtualization. It allows to monitor app features at the
three layers of ANDROID OS’s architecture, i.e., hardware, OS,
and Dalvik Virtual Machine. Different types of monitoring can
be enabled by developing custom plugins over DroidScope. In
this regard, the authors include (i) a collector for native and
Dalvik instructions traces, (ii) a profiler for API-level activity,
and (iii) a tracking system for information leakage using taint
analysis.
2) Smart Interaction: Sandbox analysis poses a limitation
when interacting with samples in an automated way, due to
the fact that some malicious apps hide their malicious activity
through the User Interface (UI). In this regard, SmartDroid
[134] presents an hybrid static and dynamic detection method
to reveal UI-based trigger conditions in ANDROID OS. While
static analysis is used to generate Activity and Function Call
Graphs (ACG and FCG, respectively), dynamic analysis is
used to explore such paths.
AppsPlayground [124] presents a similar approach combin-
ing detection techniques (ranging from taint tracing to SYS
call monitoring) along with automatic exploration strategies.
The proposed framework uses heuristics to guide the UI
inputs, avoiding redundant explorations and using contextual
information to fill editable text boxes.
3) Risk Analysis: Risk analysis techniques are emerging
as a mechanism to palliate the ineffective way in which
permissions are used to communicate potential threats to
the user [33]. Here, Grace et al. propose the use of static
assessment metrics to measure dangerous behaviors in AN-
DROID OS called RiskRanker [133]. Their proposal focuses
on conducting a scalable, efficient and accurate proof-of-
concept rather than leveraging on sophistication. Contrary,
Peng et al. [132] propose the use use probabilistic generative
models for risk ranking and scoring schemes. More precisely,
they evaluate a range of models starting from simple Basic
Naive Bayes (BNB) to advanced hierarchical mixture models,
showing that these models offer a promising mechanism for
risk scoring.
4) Similarity detection: Researchers have explored differ-
ent ways to detect repackaging in markets by detecting simi-
larity dependencies among population of applications. While
early approaches use syntactic analysis such as string-based
matching [146], recently approaches elaborate on semantic
analysis [147], [118], e.g., PDG, as it is resilient to code
obfuscation. However, semantic analysis is generally more
expensive than syntactic analysis.
A different approach is presented in [146], where sev-
eral compression algorithms are used to compute normal-
ized information distances between two applications based
on Kolmogorov complexity measurement. Their algorithm
first identifies which methods are identical and calculates
the similarity of the reminder methods using Normalized
Compression Distances (NCD). In order to reduce complexity,
the authors use a representation of each method based on
structured control flow signatures [148]. Finally, authors apply
Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) algorithm to identify
differences between similar elements.
Zhou et al. [55] propose a system called DroidMOSS for
detecting repackaged applications based on a fuzzy hashing
technique. Distinguishing features are first extracted in the
form of fingerprints, and then compared with those from other
applications in order to identify similarities. These features
are computed by applying traditional hash functions to pieces
of code of variable size. The size of the pieces is bounded
by smaller chunks of fixed size called reset points. A chunk
is considered a reset point when the resulting hash is a
prime number. Then, the edit distance is calculated between
two applications by comparing their fingerprints on identical
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matching-basis. More recently, authors have extended their
work in [149]. While their former work is designed to detect
repackaging in unofficial markets, the latter is capable of
detecting repackaging among apps in the same market.
Authors in [150] present Juxtapp, a system for detecting app
similarity. They propose an optimization over the representa-
tion of the applications as an alternative to k-grams based on
feature hashing and then use hierarchical clustering to classify
similar applications.
Authors in [147] present DNADroid, a system for detecting
cloned applications based on dependency graphs between
methods. PDG is used to detect semantic similarities by com-
paring graph isomorphism. Prior to similarity detection, au-
thors group applications based on meta-information retrieved
from each application, and they use several filters to enhance
efficiency. Although their experiments show better results than
similar approaches such as [146], the scheme is less efficient
in terms of performance. In fact, their experimental testbed is
deployed in a small cluster composed of one server and three
desktop computers over Hadoop. Even there, the analysis rate
is 0.7 applications per minute.
More recently, Suarez-Tangil et al present Dendroid [118],
a text mining approach to analyzing and classifying code
structures in Android malware families. By adapting the
standard Vector Space Model and reformulating the modelling
process followed in text mining applications, authors present
a novel way to measure similarity between malware samples.
This similarity is used to automatically classify samples into
families. Authors also investigate the application of hierarchi-
cal clustering over the feature vectors obtained for each mal-
ware family. The resulting dendograms resemble the so-called
phylogenetic trees for biological species, allowing researchers
to conjecture about evolutionary relationships among families.
Experimental results suggest that the approach is remarkably
accurate and deals efficiently with large databases of malware
instances.
F. Attack-specific Malware Identification Systems
The majority of the approaches described above focus on
general detectors using either anomaly or misuse detection
for both static and dynamic analysis. However, due to the
diversity of malware goals and incentives, other schemes are
narrowing the complexity towards detecting specific classes
of malware, such as privileged escalation, battery-depletion
attacks, or money stealing.
1) Privilege Escalation: There are two common types of
privilege escalation attacks according to whether the exploita-
tion strategy focuses on inter-process capability leakage or
system vulnerabilities. Approaches such as XManDroid [70],
Woodpecker [135], Elish et al. [138] or CHEX [139] focus on
the first class, while others such as [151] concentrate on the
latter.
XManDroid [70] is a privilege escalation detection tool
for ANDROID OS devices. Dynamic analysis is used to
identify covert channels using DFG. Woodpecker [135] is
capable of identifying both explicit and implicit leakage by
combining static with dynamic analysis. Static analysis is used
to identify possible execution paths by means of CFG, and
inter-procedural data flow analysis is used to filter out non-
dangerous paths. Additionally, app permissions are examined
to broaden leakage search. Similarly, Elish et al. [138] use
DDG providing user-interaction dependencies of more than
1000 benign and malign apps, while CHEX [139] employs
system dependence graphs over more than 5000 applications
from Google Play.
ROPdefender [152] is a generic ROP detection tool for
Windows and Linux–based OS capable of enforcing a return
address check. Although ROPdefender is not built for smart
devices, the proposed framework can be applied in this con-
text.
2) Grayware: As discussed early in this paper, grayware
poses a serious challenge to privacy leakage detection system.
Several approaches have focused on detecting such privacy
leakages, such as TaintDroid [84] for ANDROID OS devices
and PiOS [136] for IOS.
TaintDroid [84] uses dynamic taint analysis to track sen-
sitive information. It monitors variables, methods, files, and
messages throughout the program execution according to data
flow rules, and label the variables as they use the sensi-
tive data. When a piece of sensitive information attempts
to leave a taint sink, e.g., through the network interface,
TaintDroid requests user consent to do so. The authors studied
30 popular applications, showing that at least 20 of them
misused users’ private information. Experiments also show
that TaintDroid incurs 14% CPU and 4.4% memory overhead.
A major limitation of TaintDroid is its inability to distinguish
between legitimate and non-legitimate exfiltrations, especially
when facing grayware. In fact, their experiments show that
37 out of 105 instances (35%) were incorrectly classified as
false positives. Additionally, techniques such as tainting can
be circumvented through leaks via implicit flows, i.e., using
program control flow to disclose information.
AppProfiler [123] uses dynamic tainting analysis along with
static analysis to extract privacy-related behaviors. The scheme
builds a knowledge base that maps application behaviors with
API calls observed during static analysis, providing the user
with valuable information about their apps.
Finally, PiOS [136] is an information leakage detection
system for IOS devices that uses static analysis on apps.
PiOS constructs CFG paths from the sources of sensitive
information to data sinks by means of data-flow analysis. So
far, static analysis of IOS apps does not have to face the
obfuscation challenge, as obviously obfuscated apps would
not pass the revision process. However, this might change in
the coming years if non-walled-garden models such as Cydia
gain popularity.
3) Battery-depletion: Traditional anomaly and misuse de-
tection techniques have not paid much attention to unknown
energy-depletion attacks. In this regard, Kim et al. [142]
proposes a power-aware malware detection system for smart
devices. It uses dynamic analysis to monitor power sam-
ples and build a consumption model. Power signatures are
generated from monitoring malicious samples in the device,
and results are analyzed in the device or in the cloud using
noise filtering and data compression algorithms. After building
the model, malware is identified by using χ2-distance and
comparing the results with a set of signatures.
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V. OPEN RESEARCH TOPICS
Malware in smart devices still pose many challenges and
a number of important issues need to be further studied and
addressed with novel solutions. This section identifies some
open issues where research is needed. Some of these problems
are not specific to smart devices, such as for example the case
of botnets. Others, such as Online Social Networks (OSNs) –
which have attracted millions of active users in the last years–
are increasingly related to smart devices, as users mostly
access them through their smartphones and smart TVs. Thus,
security problems in these domains (e.g. socialbots [153]) will
likely target these platforms soon.
A. Automatic Malware Analysis and Classification
The impressive growth both in malware and benign apps is
making increasingly unaffordable any human-driven analysis
of potentially dangerous apps. Dynamic analysis techniques
such as those surveyed in [48] are progressively playing a
key role in detecting malware for smart devices. Current
trends in malware engineering suggest that malicious software
will continue to evolve its sophistication, in part due to
the availability of reuse-oriented development methodologies.
From the defender’s point of view, this should be exploited
to facilitate analysis and detection. For example, some works
conducted over the last years have explored the possibility
of clustering malware instances [154], [147] into classes
according to some similarity metric. Such classes can be later
used to automatically classify newly discovered specimens,
thus facilitating their analysis. We believe that further efforts
along this line are required, in particular by developing more
fine-grained techniques. For example, instead of just pointing
out what malware samples are similar to a given one, it would
be more useful to decompose the sample in components and
perform the similarity search at that level (we refer the reader
to Dendroid [118] for more details in this regard).
B. Trusted Software
In the case of current smartphones and tablets, trust on the
non-malicious nature of an app is based on two factors: (i) the
implicit assumption that the market operator has conducted
some security review before making the app available for
download; and (ii) the identity of the developer, given by
the signature attached to the app, which also provides some
evidence of the app’s integrity. The first point is not fully
reliable, as operators cannot afford to carry out an exhaustive
analysis over every submitted app; and, even if they could,
there is still some non-negligible probability of sophisticated
malware evading detection. As for the identify of the developer
and the app’s integrity, evidence suggests that most users do
not pay much attention to them, or positively ignore them
when downloading apps from alternative markets.
We believe that further efforts to improve trust in software
are required. This will be increasingly necessary in the near
future, as the number of developers –and, hence, apps– will
likely grow very significantly. Reputation systems [155], [156]
adapted to this context might offer some added value, in
particular by exploiting interactions in large user communities
such as, for example, those provided by online social networks
or mobile adhoc networks [157]. But other mechanisms for
building trust could also apply, such as for example remote
attestation protocols [158], [156], [75] or any other schemes
to ensure the authenticity and integrity of software.
C. Malware in Other Smart Devices
The experience gained from current smartphones suggests
that malware will also hit other smartdevices as soon as
they appear. Evidence in other pervasive technologies already
exists. For example, nowadays Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) systems are used in a wide range of applications,
such as transport tickets, access control systems, e-passports,
e-health applications, etc. The benefits of adopting RFID
technology for identification purposes are clear, but its as-
sociated security risks need to be addressed. One of them –
often underestimated– is malware. The use of Internet-enabled
mobile devices as RFID readers makes this sort of attacks
potentially more harmful. Most previous works have focused
on the securing the communication link between the tag and
the (mobile) reader. There are, however, some preliminary
works [159], [42] on RFID malware, but further studies and
solutions are required. Similarly, IMDs and other medical
devices will likely be an attractive target for attackers due to
the economic value of the information they can provide [43],
[160]. These devices are not prune to the software problems
like malfunctions and corrupted updated versions [161], [162].
D. Grayware and Other Privacy Issues
Applications are increasingly requiring the user to authorize
the transference of personal information to the cloud as part
of the normal use of the application. For instance, What-
sApp sends the user’s address book to establish friendship
connections [163]. However, even if the user authorizes such
transference, it does not mean that it will be used for purposes
other than those conveyed to the user, such as for example
market research. In other cases users are only informed that
some personal information will be sent, but the particulars
about what specific items or how it will be used are not
given. Identifying misuse of personal information, both on-
platform and in the cloud, is a challenging process that
is typically tackled by legal enforcement mechanisms, but
technical approaches should be explored. For instance, in the
same way that Google App Engine [164] is used to deploy
in-the-cloud applications –monitored by Google–, back-end
services for smartphones and other smart devices could be
moved to a cloud controlled and monitored by a trusted
third party. This could make feasible to monitor behavior
and enforce security policies in the cloud-end of the service,
thus complementing other security mechanisms applied in the
device.
Similar privacy-related problems arise in cloud-based mon-
itoring schemes, primarily in those that maintain a virtualized
replica of the device to carry out monitoring tasks that
are unaffordable to perform directly on the device. Privacy-
preserving monitoring systems for this scenario are required,
but also more lightweight monitoring and detection mecha-
nisms that can run on the device with an appropriate balance
between efficacy and power consumption.
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E. Cooperative security
In the near future it is very likely that many users will own
a network of smart devices, including smartphones, smart TVs
and other home appliance, and wearable computing platforms.
Such networks could be leveraged to implement cooperative
security functions, as a complement to cloud-based and on-
platform monitoring and analysis mechanisms. Ideally, several
connected devices could cooperate to improve security in a
number of ways. For example, resource-intensive tasks can
be delegated to devices with a permanent power source to
preserve the battery of mobile platforms. Similarly, mutually
monitoring schemes could be interesting, where each device
monitors the behavior of others to detect compromise.
F. Forensics-based analysis for smart device protection
Sometimes malicious programs uninstall themselves after
achieving their goals. However, analyzing evidences that they
leave behind could be used as an input for detecting future
propagations using the same infection vector. Identifying such
traces is a great challenge, particularly due to the availability
of anti-forensic tools for devices such as smartphones [165]. In
this regard, two different approaches might be worth exploring.
On the one hand, deleting evidences or attempting to neutralize
any source of evidence usually produces fresh new evidences.
On the other hand, new paradigms such as the aforementioned
replicas in the cloud, allow the creation of novel forensic
approaches on the cloud based on virtual introspection.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a comprehensive survey
on the evolution of malware for smart devices and recent
results on detection and analysis techniques. We have first
provided an overview of the security models and protection
mechanisms present in current platforms for smart devices,
mostly smartphones. Next we have proposed a characterization
of malware in terms of three key factors: pursued goals and
associated behaviors; distribution and infection channels; and
privilege acquisition strategies. Our analysis of some represen-
tative samples shows that malware is becoming increasingly
complex and adaptive, with constantly changing goals and
using multiple distribution and infection strategies.
We have also provided an analysis of the 20 most significant
proposals for detecting and analyzing malware for smart
devices proposed between 2010 and 2013. Instead of merely
enumerating and describing each one of them, we have first
identified and classifed all device features where malware
behavior could manifest. This taxonomy is complemented with
additional elements, such as where the monitoring and analysis
tasks takes place, or the specific detection technique used.
Finally, we have discussed a number of open research
problems in the hope of stimulating further research in this
thriving area.
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